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A STUDY OF CHEMICAL TESTS FOR
ALCOHOLIC INTOXICATION t
By Ric~iir R. BuRGER*
Prohibitive legislation is effective as a corrective mea-
sure only to the extent that it deters the undesirable con-
duct. In no area is this more apparent than in the legislation
which has been enacted in an attempt to curb the drinking
driver problem by prohibiting the operation of a motor
vehicle by a driver who is "intoxicated" or "under the in-
fluence" of intoxicating beverages. The mere enactment of
this prohibitory legislation has not had the desired deter-
rent effect, and the problem has continued, partly because
the degree of drunkenness which is "under the influence" is
a highly subjective state, often difficult to prove by observa-
tion. On the one hand, the arrested driver can come into
court and say that he had "just had one drink" or that he
was staggering from a blow he received on his head from
the impact of the accident, and a sympathetic jury would
probably acquit.' Also, the shock of the accident or arrest
often enables the drinking driver to sufficiently pull himself
together so that his condition can go unnoticed even by
experienced investigators.
Conversely, the person whose apparent symptoms of
drunkenness stem from an actual injury or physiological
disorder is often placed under arrest and left alone to sober
t This article is based on a paper originally prepared for Professor L.
Whiting Farinholt Jr's. Seminar on Medico-Legal Problems at the Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law. Grateful acknowledgment is made to
Dr. Russell S. Fisher, Chief Medical Examiner of the State of Maryland, for
materials made available to the author, and to Professor G. Kenneth
Reiblich for advice in the article's final preparation.
* A.B., University of Maryland, 1955; LL.B., University of Maryland
School of Law, 1957.
'People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N. E. 2d 567, 570 (1951)
"Medical science recognizes sixty pathological conditions which pro-
duce symptoms similar to those produced by alcohol, yet the law per-
mits nonexpert lay witnesses to testify to objective symptoms commonly
associated with alcoholic intoxication on the theory that sobriety or
intoxication are matters of common knowledge."
A false claim of one or more of these conditions could enable a person,
accused of drunken driving, to escape conviction.
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up at a time when immediate medical treatment should be
administered.' Also, the person who has actually had but
one drink often finds it very difficult to rebut the testimony
of an arresting officer who has, for one reason or another,
made an incorrect determination.
Chemical tests for intoxication have been offered as a
solution to these problems. If these tests are practical and
accurate, and if their use will violate no rights of the in-
dividual, they would be invaluable to the law enforcement
bodies as well as to the wrongly accused driver. Before
accepting or rejecting the tests and the legislation which
sanctions them, thorough examination is necessary.
THE CHEMISTRY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF ALCOHOL
IN THE BODY
Alcohol is present in the body of every person, drinker
and non-drinker alike, as a natural constituent.3 However,
the amount is negligible, and this article will deal with
alcohol taken into the body by the drinking of an alcoholic
beverage. While part of the alcohol in the beverage in-
gested is absorbed directly from the stomach, by far the
greater part passes on into the small intestine where it is
absorbed into the blood in the vessels located in the walls
of this organ. Once absorbed, the alcohol is rapidly carried
by the bloodstream throughout the body, being distributed
in each part in about the same proportion as the water
content of that part.4 Within a short time the concentration
in the blood and in the tissues reaches an equilibrium, this
being attained more rapidly in parts of the body having a
generous blood supply such as the brain and the liver.'
As a result, it is possible to determine by an analysis of one
body tissue or fluid, the alcohol concentration of another
part of the body.'
Approximately ninety to ninety-five per cent of the
alcohol distributed in the body is gradually metabolized or
'Ibid.
8KRANTZ AND CARR, PHARMACOLOGIC PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
(3rd ed. 1954) 391. The human brain concentration of ethyl alcohol is
0.0004%, the human blood concentration 0.004 %, and the human liver con-
centration 0.0026%.
'Hansman, Driving Under the Influence of Intoaicating Drink, 40 Med.
J. Australia, Vol. II, 388 (1953); Harger, Lamb, and Hulpieu, A Rapid
Chemical Test for Intooication Employing Breath, 110 J. A. M. A. 779
(1938).
5Newman, Research on Alcohol, 13 Stan. Med. Bul. 98, 101 (1955);
1 GRAY, ATrORNEYS' TEXTBoOK OF MEDICINE (3rd ed., 1940), Par. 59.05.
' Muehlberger, Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intozication, 1 Am. Pract.
360, 362 (1947) ; 1 GRAY, Zoc. cit., ibid.
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"burned", principally in the liver.7 As the alcohol is burned
in the liver, its supply is replenished from all over the body,
the concentration decreasing in each part at about the same
rate.' The five to ten per cent not metabolized is excreted
in about equal parts in the urine and in the breath.'
It is common knowledge that individuals react differ-
ently to a given amount of alcohol swallowed. One of the
reasons for this variation is the fact that alcohol is absorbed
into the bloodstream at different rates, the rate of absorp-
tion being affected by such factors as the presence or
absence of food in the stomach, dilution or concentration of
alcohol in the beverage, length of the period of ingestion,
distastefulness of the beverage to the drinker because of its
flavor or unpleasant memories associated with it, buffer
content of the beverage, emotional state of the drinker,"
and, possibly, consumption tolerance." If by operation of
one or more of these factors the alcohol is absorbed slowly,
the metabolic process continuing, high concentrations of
alcohol in the body will not be reached. Variation is also
produced by the fact that although the rate of metabolism
of alcohol in a given individual is practically constant, 2
the rate varies among different individuals. In the cases of
those persons who burn alcohol rapidly, the amount ab-
sorbed is more quickly disposed'of and high concentrations
are never reached. 18 Therefore, for the purpose of deter-
mining the degree of intoxication of any individual at a
given time, the important fact to be ascertained is the con-
centration of alcohol in the body tissues and fluids at that
time and not the quantity of alcoholic beverage consumed
nor the amount of unabsorbed alcohol in the stomach.
Contrary to the common belief that alcohol is a stimu-
lant, alcohol in the body acts as a depressant of nerve func-
' Newman, supra, n. 5; Hansman, 8upra, n. 4.
'Hansman, ibid; HARRISON et al., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEMICINE
(2nd ed., 1954), 775-776.9 Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L. J. 250, 258 (1946);
Fisher, Alcohol, Accidents & Crime, 14 The Foundation Says, No. 2, 26
(1956).
10 Newman, supra, n. 5, 100-101; Newman, supra, n. 9, 255-256.
n Muehlberger, Alcohol Tolerance, 1940 Report of Committee on Tests for
Intoxication to National Safety Council (Street and Highway Traffic Sec-
tion) 26-27 where after a survey and analysis of the problem the author
concludes "... tolerant persons do not have as high a concentration of
alcohol in their body fluid8 as do others under the same circumstances".
Consumption tolerance (susceptibility of the walls of the gastro intestinal
tract to absorption of alcohol) is not to be confused with constitutional
tolerance (susceptibility of nerve cells to the depressant effect of alcohol).
"Newman, supra, n. 5, 101-102; HARRISON et al., loc. cit., supra, n. 8.
18 Gonzales and Gettler, Alcohol and The Pedestrian In Traffic Accidents,
117 J. A. M. A. 1523, 1524 (1941).
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tion, 4 and this depression of the nervous system produces
the symptoms which are recognized as intoxication. 5 The
feeling of stimulation is attributable to a release of in-
hibitions and not to an increase in motor ability."6 The
degree of nerve depression is more or less proportional to
the concentration of alcohol in the center of nerve activity,
the brain. 7 Because of this relationship and because of the
equilibrium that exists throughout the body, in proportion
to water content, for alcohol absorbed, the authorities have
felt that the concentration of alcohol in the tissues and
fluids of the body is a reliable index of the degree of intoxi-
cation.' s This conclusion has not, however, been entirely
free from criticism."
If, as contended, there exists a close correlation between
the concentration of alcohol in the body and the degree of
intoxication, it is necessary next to determine what body
substance is the most accurate and at the same time the
most practicable for testing to ascertain this concentration.
Since alcohol in the brain is required to produce intoxica-
tion, it follows that an analysis of brain tissue would yield
the most accurate results. However, this is impossible un-
less the subject is dead. Spinal fluid has been suggested as
a reliable testing substance because of its close proximity
11 Kaye and Haag, Medico-legal Evaluations of Blood-Alcohol Levels, 80
Va. Med. Mthly. 638 (1953) ; Muehlberger, 8upra, n. 6, 361; Newman, supra,
n. 5, 103.
15HA nsoN, op. cit., supra, n. 8, 776; Chemical Tests for Intoxication,
1938 Report of Committee on Tests for Intoxication to National Safety
Council (Street and Highway Traffic Section) 4, 7-8; GREENBERG, The Con-
centration Of Alcohol In The Blood and It8 Significance, ALCOHOL, SCIENCE
AND SOCIETY (Q. J. of Studies on Alcohol, 1945) 45, 46.
10 Newman, Research on Alcohol, 13 Stan. Med. Bul. 98, 103 (1955):
"The apparent stimulating effect is generally ascribed to a removal
of inhibitions, with a freedom of expression not otherwise attainable in
the majority of people. That the productions of the mildly inebriated
are brilliant only to others similarly affected can be vouched for by any-
one who has done investigative work with alcohol in human subjects."
Accord: Hansman, Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Drink, 40
Med. J. Australia, Vol. II, 389 (1953).
1? Muehlberger, Chemical Tests For Alcoholic Intoxication, 1 Am. Pract.
360, 361 (1947) ; HAwE3?, Practical Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxica-
tion, Ch. 11, JuDGE AND PRos rUTo IN Ta.&vno COURT, 200, 203 (1951).
IsHarger, Lamb and Hulpieu, A Rapid Chemical Test for Intoxication
Employing Breath, 110 J. A. M. A. 779, 783 (1938) ; Muehlberger, Medico-
legal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. Crim. Law
& Crm. 411, 415 (1948); Newman, supra, n. 9, 263-267; Greenberg, supra,
n. 15; Hansman, supra, n. 16, 389.
'5See mainly: Rabinowitch, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of
Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 225 (1948); Gardner,
Breath-Tests For Alcohol: A Sampling Study of Mechanical Evidence, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 289 (1953) and authorities cited. However, many of the in-
consistencies set forth in the latter work have proved to be non-existent;
the former has been specifically rebutted. See n. 42, infra.
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to the brain.20 Not only is this difficult to obtain,2" but,
further, it has been found that the alcohol content of the
spinal fluid in the lumbar region, the area of the spine
where punctures for fluid are customarily made, lags far
behind the brain alcohol concentration. 22
Except in the experimental situation, sweat is not
present in sufficient amounts to afford analysis.28 Saliva,
on the other hand, is more easily obtained and has been
recommended as a testing substance by some of the authori-
ties.24 It should be noted, however, that if the subject has
had a drink shortly before the test is made, the result of
such test may be distorted by the residue in the mouth.25
This residual alcohol disappears within five to ten minutes
after the last drink is taken.2
It is generally well settled that a fairly constant rela-
tionship exists between the concentration of alcohol in the
blood and in freshly secreted urine, the ratio being about
1:1.35.27 Although a specimen can be obtained with rela-
tive ease,28 it may be quite difficult to obtain one that would
afford accurate results. If non-alcoholic urine was present
in the bladder prior to drinking, the alcohol concentration
will be diluted.21 On the other hand, if the alcohol concen-
tration of the body is decreasing and the urine has been
retained in the bladder for a long period of time, the alcohol
content may be appreciably higher than the actual concen-
tration in the blood. 0 To insure accuracy the subject should
be made to urinate immediately, and a second sample
2*,Gonzales and Gettler, supra, n. 13; 1 GRAY, ATORNEYs' TsXTBoox or
MFICINE (3rd ed., 1949), par. 59.07.
Cameron, Alcohol and Automobile Driving, 43 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 46,
47 (1940) ; Greenberg, supra, n. 15, 47.
" Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 'Ky. L. J. 250, 263-264
(1946).
23Cameron, supra, n. 21.1 Newman, Research on Alcohol, 13 Stan. Med. Bul. 98, 101 (1955);
Holcomb, Alcohol In Relation To Traffic Accidents, 111 J. A. M. A. 1076,
1076-1077 (1938) ; Muehlberger, supra, n. 17, 362.
'Selesnick, Alcoholic Intoxication, 110 J. A. M. A. 775 (1938) ; Muehl-
berger, 8upra, n. 17, 362; but cf. Chemical Tests For Intoxication, 1948
Report of Committee on Tests for Intoxication to National Safety Council(Street and Highway Traffic Section) 4, 14, which says that contamination
from recent drinking "can be avoided by proper collection of the sample".
'* See n. 44, infra.
'Newman, supra, n. 22, 264; GRAY, op. cit., supra, n. 20, 623; Haggard
et al., The Use Of The Urine In The Chemical Test For Intoxication, 115
J. A. M. A. 1680, 1682 (1940).
11 Southgate and Carter, Excretion of Alcohol in Urine, 1 Br. Med. J. 463
(1926), reported that intoxicated subjects frequently would not or could
not produce a specimen when requested to do so; GRAY, op. cit., supra,
n. 20, 623.
GRAY, loc. cit., ibid; Selesnick, 8upra, n. 25.
81 Selesnick, supra, n. 25, 775-776; Newman, supra, n. 22, 264.
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should be collected as soon thereafter as possible.3' This
procedure has the disadvantage of being time consuming at
a period when the individual may be sobering up or becom-
ing more intoxicated.
Breath is perhaps the most easily obtained body ma-
terial. Because of the rapidity with which the test of a
breath sample can be made, results being available in five
minutes, 2 this determinant of intoxication would be highly
preferred if accurate. Alcohol passes into the breath from
blood in the vessels lining the respiratory tract and lungs.3
It has been determined by a number of authorities that the
relationship between the concentration of alcohol in the
blood and the concentration in lung air (alveolar air) is
approximately 2100: 1.8 Since the amount of carbon dioxide
in air exhaled from the lungs is relatively constant, 5 by
measuring the carbon dioxide content of a given breath
sample, the fractional amount of lung air present in the
sample can be ascertained. Then, by measuring the amount
of alcohol in the same sample, the percentage of lung air
being known, the amount of alcohol in the blood can be
determined. 6
The four main breath testing devices are the Drunk-
ometer, the Intoximeter, the Breatholizer and the Alco-
meter. The Drunkometer, developed by Harger, deter-
mines the alcohol-carbon dioxide ratio of the subject's
breath." Based on a constant for carbon dioxide expiration
and the 2100:1 ratio between alcohol in the blood and lung
air, the test is complete when the breath sample containing
alcohol reacts with a permanganate-sulphuric acid reagent.
The carbon dioxide collected is weighed, and a result-
"Evaluating Chemical Tests For Intoxication, 1953 Report of Committee
on Tests for Intoxication to National Safety Council (Street and Highway
Traffic Section) 11, fn. 11; Hnona, Practical Aspects of Chemical Tests
For Intoaication, Ch. 11, JuDGE AND PROSECUTOR IN TRAFFIc CoURT, 200,
215 (1951).
8Harger, tc. cit., ibid.
GREENBERO, The Concentration of Alcohol In The Blood And Its Signifi-
cance, ALaoHOL, ScmNncE AND SocInTY (Q. 3. of Studies on Alcohol, 1945)
45, 48.
"Report, supra, n. 31, 13; Harger, Forney and Baker, Estimation of The
Level Of Blood Alcohol From Analysis Of Breath, 17 Q. J. Studies On
Alcohol 1 (1956), and studies cited.
81Harger, "Debunking" The Drunkometer, 40 3. Crim. Law & Crim. 497,
498, 504 (1949) ; Harger, Lamb and Hulpleu, A Rapid Chemical Test For
Intozication Employinug Breath, 110 J. A. M. A. 779, 780 (1938). Alveolar
air of normal subjects always contains approximately 5.5 per cent carbon
dioxide by volume; ". . . fluctuation due to posture, fasting and other
factors . . . is not very great and most of it may be eliminated by placing
the subject in a sitting or reclining position".
Harger et al., ibid.
BT Harger, supra, n. 35.
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ing figure for breath alcohol is determined, which after
conversion by the 2100:1 ratio gives the blood alcohol
concentration. 8
The Intoximeter, introduced by Jetter, Moore, and For-
rester, employs the basic principles of the Drunkometer.
The main difference is in the method by which the amount
of alcohol is determined. The alcohol and moisture in the
breath are absorbed by magnesium perchiorate; this solid
later being dissolved in water, the alcohol distilled off, and
the distillate analyzed.89
The two most recently developed breath testers, the
Alcometer and the Breatholizer, do not collect carbon
dioxide and provide results more quickly than the others.
The Alcometer, developed mainly by Dr. Greenberg, util-
izes iodine pentoxide which releases iodine upon coming
in contact with alcohol. The released iodine is absorbed in
a starch solution, the intensity of the resulting change in
color being measured by a photoelectric cell in the instru-
ment, and results in terms of milligrams of alcohol per
cubic centimeters of blood are registered on a guage within
a matter of minutes." The Breatholizer employs a yellow
potassium dichromate reagent which is discolored in pro-
portion to the amount of alcohol in the breath sample. This
discoloration is measured by two photoelectric cells located
on either side of the reagent, and, as in the Alcometer,
direct results are registered on a calibrated dial.41
Though breath testing has the advantages of speed and
simplicity, it has been criticized on the grounds of ac-
curacy.42 The chemical reagents used in the testing devices
may be improperly weighed both before and after the
tests;" the sample may be contaminated by alcohol remain-
- Ibid, 497-498.
10 Harger, 8upra, n. 35.
"OGreenberg and Keator, A Portable Automatic Apparatus For The
Indirect Determination Of The Concentration Of Alcohol In The Blood,
2 Q. J. Studies on Alcohol 57 (1941).
'1Dorlaque, New Breath Rmeller Is Best Of All, Indianapolis News,
March 2, 1955.
2Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L. J. 250, 265 (1946);
Rabinowitch, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxica-
tion, 39 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 225, 243-244 (1948) and authorities cited,
but cf. Harger, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxi-
cation, 39 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 402 (1948) and Muehlberger, Medicolegal
Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. Crim. Law &
Crim. 411 (1948), both of which specifically rebut the article by Dr.
Rabinowitch.
" State v. Hunter, 4 N. J. Super. 531, 68 A. 2d 274 (1949), where a con-
viction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was
reversed, improper scales having been used to weigh the chemicals taken
from a Drunkometer after a test had been performed on the defendant.
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ing in the mouth from recent drinking,44 eructation,45 or
regurgitation; 6 the testing equipment may contain traces
of alcohol or oxidizable material from prior tests;47 and
temperature may affect test results unless controlled.48 The
advocates of breath testing acknowledge some error in these
devices but declare that it is so small as to be negligible. 9
If it were not for the practical and legal difficulties
which surround its procurement, all authorities would
agree that blood is the material of choice with which to
determine the alcohol concentration of the brain5 Blood
reflects the alcohol concentration of the brain at the time
the sample is taken more nearly than does any other of the
test substances.5 There is no difficulty in the analysis of
blood,52 and it is practically free from contamination. 3
However, the sample must be drawn and the analysis must
be made by a physician or a skilled technician,"' and this
procedure is time consuming where no physician is avail-
able or where the suspect must be detained until results of
an analysis are obtained. 55
"Muehlberger, Chemical Tests For Alcoholic Intoxication, 1 Am. Pract.
360, 362 (1947) ; Harger et al., supra, n. 35, 784: "... this effect Is almost
gone in five minutes and entirely disappears after about ten . . ."; Evaluat-
ing Chemical Tests For Intoxication, 1953 Report of Committee on Tests for
Intoxication to National Safety Council (Street and Highway Traffic Sec-
tion) 6, where, in tests made by the committee, fifteen minutes were allowed
to elapse after the taking of the last drink before the sample was taken.
'
5 Newman, supra, n. 42.
Rabinowitch, 8upra, n. 42, 244; Selesnick, Alcoholic Intoxication, 110
J. A. M. A. 775 (1938).
"1 GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TExToox OF MEDICINE (3rd ed., 1949), 624.
"Rabinowitch, supra, n. 42; Cameron, Alcohol and Automobile Driving,
43 Can. Med. Ass'n. J. 46, 49 (1940).
'
9 Harger, "Debunking" The Drunkometer, 40 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 496,
498 (1949) ; 1953 Report, supra, n. 44, 10.
10 Selesnick, supra, n. 46, 776; Newman, supra, n. 42; GREENBERG, The
Concentration Of Alcohol In The Blood And Its Significance, ALCOHOL,
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, (Q. J. of Studies on Alcohol, 1945) 45, 47; Newman,
Research On Alcohol, 13 Stan. Med. Bul. 98, 101 (1955), where because of
the process In n. 70, infra, Dr. Newman claims capillary blood to be a more
valid indicator of the brain alcohol concentration at the time the sample
is taken than is venous blood.
Selesnick, 8upra, n. 46, 766; Chemical Tests For Intoxication, 1938
Report of Committee on Tests For Intoxication to National Safety Council
(Street and Highway Traffic Section) 4, 14; Greenberg, supra, n. 50.
Greenberg, supra, n. 50.
ISelesnick, supra, n. 46, 776; Muehlberger, Medicolegal Aspects of
Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 411,
413-414 (1948) ; Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L. J. 250,
265 (1945).
"Newman, supra, n. 53; HARCER, Practical Aspects of Chemical Tests
For Intoxication, JUDGE AND PROSECUTOR IN TRAFFIC COURT, Ch. 11 (1951)
200, 215-216.
5Constitutional problems will be dealt with hereafter, circa, p. 206,
infra.
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CHEMICAL TESTING LEGISLATION
All states have statutes which in general prohibit the
operation of a motor vehicle while the operator is either
"intoxicated" or "under the influence" of intoxicating bev-
erages. The terms "intoxicated" and "under the influence"
have, unfortunately, no generally accepted meanings, but
the states may be divided into three categories by the con-
duct which is (by court interpretation) punishable by these
terms: those which prohibit impairment of the driver's
ability in the slightest degree56 (so slight that it can go un-
detected by witnesses of his conduct); those which prohibit
the appreciable impairment of the driver's normal control
of his body and mental faculties5 7 (conduct that could prob-
ably be witnessed by others); and those which prohibit the
impairment in an appreciable degree of the driver's ability
to operate the motor vehicle in the manner that an ordi-
narily prudent and cautious man in full possession of his
faculties, using reasonable care, would use in driving a
similar vehicle under similar conditions.58 The states in
which the terms have not been defined have left the prob-
lems of definition and application to the trier of facts.59
The Maryland statute is embodied in Section 171 of
Article 66 h of the 1951 Code. "It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.., to drive or attempt to drive any vehicle, streetcar
or trackless trolley within this state." The Maryland Court
of Appeals has not defined "under the influence", and it
would seem that the lower Maryland courts have probably
of necessity aligned themselves with the states in the
second group requiring visible evidence of the accused's
drunken conduct before conviction can be had.60
A model statute for chemical tests for intoxication has
been proposed by the National Safety Council, the Ameri-
16 Arizona: State v. Duguld, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937). Massachu-
setts: Commonwealth v. Lyseth, 250 Mass. 555, 146 N. E. 18 (1925).
u' Idaho: Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A. L. R. 317
(1927). North Carolina: State v. Blankenship, 229 N. C. 589, 50 S. E. 2d 724
(1948).
5California: People v. McGrath, 94 Cal. App. 520, 271 P. 549 (1928);
New York: People v. Weaver, 188 App. Div. 395, 177 N. Y. S. 71 (1919).
9 Maryland: Singleton v. Roman, 195 Md. 241, 72 A. 2d 705 (1950);
Kentucky: Mahin's Adm'r v. McClellan, 279 Ky. 595, 131 S. W. 2d 478
(1939).
Whiteford, Drunk Test Bil Moves, Baltimore Sun, January 30, 1957.
"At present, he [Major William H. Weber, executive officer of the
State police] said, members of the State police force can charge only the
Imost flagrantly intoxicated', as they have to depend upon visual signs
to detect those under the influence."
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can Medical Association, and others, which establishes
three classes into which the drinking driver may be placed:
"1. If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall
be presumed that the defendant was not under the
influence of intoxicating liquor;
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent
but less than 0.15 per cent by weight of alcohol in
the defendant's blood, such fact shall not give rise
to any presumption that the defendant was or was
not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but
such fact may be considered with other competent
evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant;
3. If there was at that time 0.15 per cent, or more by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall
be presumed that the defendant was under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor."81
The essence of this statute has been embodied into the
criminal law of twenty-three states and Puerto Rico. 62 The
61Uniform Vehicle Code, Nat'l. Comm. on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances, Sec. 11-902(b) 1, 2, 3. (1954, U. S. Gov't. Print. Off., Wash,
ington, D. C.).
e2Arizona, Auiz. REv. STAT. ANN., 1956, §28-692; Delaware, DE.. CODz
A'NN., 1953 (Cum. Supp. 1956), Tit. 11, §3507; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN.,
1937 (Cum. Supp. 1955), §68-1625; Idaho, IDAHio CODE, 1948 (Cum. Supp.
1955), §49-520.2; Indiana, BuRNs' IND. STAT. ANN., 1952 (Cur. Supp. 1955),
§47-2003; Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT., 1949 (Supp. 1955), §8-1001 through
1007; Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN., 1955, §189.520; Maine, Mr. REv.
STAT., 1954, c. 22, §150; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN., 1945 (Cur. Supp.
1956), §169.12; Nebraska, Nm. REv. STAT., 1943 (Reissue of 1952),§39-727.01; New Hampshire, N. H. REv. STAT. ANN., 1955, §262:20; New
Jersey, N. J. STAT. ANN., 1937 (Cum. Supp. 1955), §39:4-50.1; New York,
McKINNEY'S N. Y. LAWS, VEH. AND Tw's. LAWS, §70(5); North Dakota,
N. D. LAWS, 1953, c. 247; Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT., 1955, §483.630; South
Carolina, S. C. CODE, 1952, §46-344; South Dakota, S. D. CODE, 1939 (Supp.
1952), §44.0302-1; Tennessee, TENN. CoDE ANN., 195, §§59-1032-1033; Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN., 1953, §41-6-44; Virginia, VA. CODE, 1950 (Supp. 1956),
§§18-75.1-75.3; Washington, WASH. REV. CODE, 1951, §46.56.010; Wisconsin,
WiS. STAT., 1953, §85.13(4); Wyoming, WYO. COMP. STAT., 1945 (Cure.
Supp. 1955), §60-414.
Chemical tests have been accepted in other states, not having specific
legislation, by court approval: California, People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d
252, 260 P. 2d 8 (1953) (blood) ; Colorado, Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36,
240 P. 2d 512 (1951) (blood); Florida, Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547,
18 So. 2d 752 (1944) (blood) ; Illinois, People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504,
99 N. E. 2d 567 (1951) (breath) ; Iowa, State v. Haner, 231 Iowa 348,
1 N. W. 2d 91 (1941) (blood) ; New Mexico, Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N. M.
385, 271 P. 2d 827 (1954) (blood) ; Oklahoma, Bowden v. State, 95 Okla.
Cr. 382, 246 P. 2d 427 (1952) (blood and urine) ; Texas, McKay v. State,
155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S. W. 2d 173 (1950) (breath).
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main criticism of this legislation is that the levels of intoxi-
cation established thereby are not valid determinates in all
people, or in other words, not all persons who have a blood-
alcohol concentration of 0.15 per cent are "under the in-
fluence".6 s Whether or not this criticism is well founded
largely depends upon what definition the courts of the in-
dividual state have given to this term.
Many clinical studies have been conducted to determine
at what blood-alcohol level a given degree of intoxication
occurs. Even as the courts have reached varied results
while attempting to reduce this term to a workable formula,
so also have the researchers used different standards to
determine when a person was under the influence. Some
studies have been based on clinical intoxication (the stage
at which a person has a gross gait abnormality or is unable
to walk and has at least two of the following: gross abnor-
mality of speech, or is unable to speak, flushed face, dilated
pupils, and alcoholic odor of breath) and they have re-
ported that there is great variation in the constitutional
tolerance of individuals to a given blood-alcohol level. Fore-
most among these is the study of Jetter who reported that
of the 1,000 subjects observed only 47 per cent were clinic-
ally intoxicated in a group whose blood-alcohol level was
between 0.125 and 0.175 per cent, and that 0.425 per cent
was the level of absolute clinical intoxication.6 4
Other studies have investigated the degree of deteriora-
tion in the individual before the outward signs of intoxica-
tion appear, testing such things as judgment, reaction time,
and motor ability. While recognizing the degree of varia-
tion between individuals in their tolerance to a given level
of blood-alcohol, several of these investigations have estab-
lished that all persons are to some degree affected at blood-
alcohol readings below 0.15 per cent. 5
0 Supra, n. 19.
" Jetter, Studies In Alcohol, 196 Am. J. Med. S. 475, 479 (1938). See also
Bogen, Drunkenness, A Quantitative Study Of Acute Alcoholic Intoxication,
89 J. A. M. A. 1508 (1927) ; Smith and Stewart, Diagnosis of Drunkenness
From The Excretion Of Alcohol, 1 Br. Med. J. 87 (1932); Bavis, 145
Drunken Drivers: A Blood And Urine Alcohol Study, 25 J. Lab. & Clin.
Med. 823 (1940). On the question of tolerance, see Muehlberger, Alcohol
Tolerance, 1940 Report of Committee on Tests for Intoxication to National
Safety Council ('Street and Highway Traffice Section) 25, 27.4 5Harger, Lamb and Hulpleu, A Rapid Chemical Test For Intoxication
Employing Breath, 110 J. A. M. A. 779, 784 (1938) ; ,GEENmBm, The Concen-
tration Of Alcohol In The Blood And Its Significance, ALcoHo, SCIENCE
AND SOCIETY (Q. J. of Studies on Alcohol, 1945) 45, 50; Evaluating Chemical
Tests For Intoxication, 1953 Report of Committee on Tests for Intoxication
to National Safety Council (Street and Highway Traffic Section) 11.
Newman and Fletcher, The Effect Of Alcohol On Driving Skill, 115
J. A. M. A. 1600 (1940), testing individuals in an experimental situation
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The reports of at least three studies have indicated that
the problem is more complicated than a simple classifica-
tion by blood-alcohol readings. After observation of both
humans and animals, these investigators claim that the
blood-alcohol concentration is not alone an accurate deter-
minant, but that the time in which the concentration was
reached and the length of time it has been maintained
directly affect the degree of intoxication.6 If the results of
these tests are to be taken at face value, the validity of the
model statute's classification of a person as being under the
influence at 0.15 per cent would be in serious doubt. How-
ever, the results of the most recent of these studies, that of
Newman and Abramson, have been discounted in a later
article by Dr. Newman67 in which he acknowledged:
".. . it has recently been demonstrated by three in-
vestigators working independently that the degree of
intoxication in a given individual is dependent not only
under simulated driving conditions, concluded that there was deterioration
in the performance of all individuals whose blood-alcohol concentration
had risen above 105 mg./100 cc. or 0.105 per cent. Newman, Research On
Alcohol, 13 Stan. Med. Bul. 98, 104-105 (1955), affirms these prior findings.
Brecher, Hartman, and Leonard, Effect Of Alcohol On Binocular Vision,
39 Am. J. Ophth., No. 2, Part II, 44, 51 (1955), studying the effect of alcohol
on eyesight concluded:
"It is interesting to note that legal intoxication is generally accepted
as a 0.15-percent alcohol concentration. In the 0.05-0.15 percent range
an individual is considered 'under the influence'. From these experi-
ments It can be seen that at the level of definite intoxication, fusion
power and convergence are very markedly impaired. At the 0.05-percent
level neither of these mechanisms seems seriously handicapped but,
somewhere between 0.05 and 0.15 percent, all subjects showed definite
impairment."
Bjerver and Goldberg, Effect Of Alcohol Ingestion On Driving Ability,
11 Q. J. Studies on Alcohol 1 (1950), administering laboratory and prac-
tical driving tests to a control and alcohol group In Sweden concluded that
the threshold of Impairment in driving ability Is a blood alcohol concen-
tration of 0.035-0.04 percent and that all subjects tested were impaired in
at least one of the tests administered at blood alcohol concentrations well
below 0.15 percent.
Hansman, Driving Under The Influence Of Intowicating Drink, 40 Med.
J. Australia, Vol. II, 388, 389 (1953), lists eight ways in which a person
is affected by slight doses of alcohol: (1) over confidence, (2) psychic dis-
turbances, (3) disturbances affecting eyesight, (4) disturbances affecting
reaction time, (5) disturbances affecting powers of concentration, (6) dis-
turbances affecting judgment of distance, (7) disturbances affecting judg-
ment of time, and (8) disturbances of coordination.
"Mirsky, Piker, Rosenbaum, and Lederer, "Adaptation" Of The Central
Nervous System To Varying Concentrations Of Alcohol In The Blood,
2 Q. J. Studies of Alcohol 35 (1941) ; Eggleton, Effect of Alcohol on the
Nervous System, 32 Brit. J. Psychol. 52 (1941); Newman and Abramson,
Relation Of Alcohol Concentration To Intooication, 48 Proc. Soc. Exp't'l
Bio. & Med. 509 (1941).
0Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intomication, 34 Ky. L. J. 250 (1946).
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on the alcohol concentration, but also on how rapidly
that concentration was achieved.""8
but concluded:
"In spite of the variability in tolerance to alcohol
and the variation due to different rates of increment
of alcohol concentration, the work of Newman and
Fletcher has shown conclusively that in all individuals
a blood alcohol concentration appreciably above 105
mgm. per 100 cc. is capable of affecting the ability of
the individual to perform skilled acts in an appreciable
degree." 9
This would seem to indicate that Dr. Newman considers
this variation to be a factor in determining intoxication70
but not sufficiently significant to impeach the 0.15 per cent
standard.
Thus, in those states which prohibit the impairment of
the individual driver's conduct in the slightest degree, the
presumptions of the model statute viewed in the light of
the reported studies would seem to be valid. However, in
states where appreciable impairment or impairment of
ability below the standard of the reasonable man is needed
for conviction, the claim of a possibility of unjust conviction
under the model statute would be valid.
Maryland has not defined the term "under the in-
fluence". 7  In the absence of a judicial definition of this
term, any legislation establishing chemical tests should also
clearly define it if the above problems of prosecution and
enforcement are to be avoided. Since every citizen owes
a duty to his fellow motorists and pedestrians to at all times
Ibid, 261.
Ibid, 2620 0 Newman, Research, supra, n. 65, 101, explained:
"With rapid absorption of alcohol from the gut, the entry of alcohol
into the bloodstream exceeds the rate at which it can be distributed to
the tissues; as a result the organs with the most adequate blood supply
may achieve an alcohol concentration a good deal higher than would
be expected from the dose administered. This 'overshooting' may be an
important factor in the observation that the degree of intoxication is
higher at a given blood alcohol concentration when this is rising than
when it is declining."
'0 Cf. Lilly v. State, 212 Md. 436, 129 A. 2d 839 (1957), affirming a con-
viction of manslaughter by automobile. Evidence that the defendant's
blood alcohol content was .11 per cent was used by -the State to show that
the driver had been drinking as an element of gross negligence, although
whether he was under the influence was not an issue in the case. The Court
of Appeals recognized "that the intoxication point is .15%", probably using
"intoxication" synonymously with "under the influence".
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be at his best while operating an automobile, the "slight
degree" test is not unreasonably high.7
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENr PRIVILEGE
Where a physician is called to treat an injured person
and is at the time requested by the authorities to secure a
sample of a body fluid (especially in the case of blood) for
chemical determination of intoxication, the physician-
patient privilege has been raised in some jurisdictions when
the doctor later sought to explain in court the results of
the determination." This privilege did not exist at common
law.73 Many states have enacted statutes providing that in-
formation obtained by a physician in the treatment of a
patient cannot be introduced in evidence against the in-
jured party over his objection. These statutes are generally
limited to information necessary to the proper treatment of
the patient, and therefore it does not seem likely that a
court would allow the results of these chemical tests to be
brought within the privilege." One statute has, however,
been interpreted to allow this defense."5 There is no physi-
cian-patient privilege in Maryland either by statute or
case law.70
CONSTIT[rJONAL QUFSTONS
When the results of a chemical test for intoxication are
offered in evidence by the prosecution, certain constitu-
tional questions may arise: Is the enforcement of a pre-
sumption of intoxication when blood-alcohol reaches .15
per cent, a denial of due process? Is the taking of a body
fluid or breath sample from the accused without his consent
an unreasonable search and seizure? Is admission of the
"nSee: Spriggs, Alcohol And Road Accidents, 23 Med.-Leg. J. 47, 48-52
(1955), which discusses the incidence of slight intoxication in automobile
accidents.
The argument has been advanced that a highly skilled driver may be a
better driver while "under the influence" than are many unskilled licensed
drivers while sober. It should be noted that in the analogous problem of
speed limits, a skilled driver operating a vehicle in good mechanical con-
diction may be able to drive safely at speeds in excess of the posted limits,
but the speed limits are set considerably lower for the protection of all.
7Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P. 2d 998 (1945) ; Richter v.
Hoglund, 132 F. 2d 748 (C. C. A. 7) (1943).
8 WIoMoRm, EviDmEcE (3rd ed., 1940) 802.
7, Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-legal Aspects Of The Blood Test To Deter-
mine Intozoication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 252, 262 (1939).
"OKLA. STAT. (1951), Art. 12, Sec. 385, as applied in Clapp v. State, 73
Okla. Cr. 261, 120 P. 2d 381 (1941).
7' O'Brien v. State, 126 Md. 270, 284, 94 A. 1034 (1915).
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evidence obtained a violation of the accused's right against
self-incrimination? Is due process denied by a forcible
extraction of the test sample?
The Presumption and Due Process
The presumption of intoxication in the model statute
set out above is a presumption of fact. Legislation provid-
ing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie
evidence of another is merely codification of a rule of
evidence and is well within legislative power.77 However,
certain standards must be followed before such a legislative
enactment will meet the requirements of due process. In
the case of Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed,s a Missis-
sippi statute provided that proof of injury inflicted by the
operation of locomotives or cars of a railroad company shall
be prima facie evidence of lack of reasonable care and skill
on the part of the company in reference to such an injury.
The United States Supreme Court speaking through Mr.
Justice Lurton upheld the statute, over a claim of denial of
due process, and set forth the following rule:
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from
evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due
process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the
law it is only essential that there shall be some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a
purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not, under
guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, oper-
ate to preclude the party from the right to present his
defense to the main fact thus presumed."79
The Court further pointed out that statutes involving
presumptions of fact are numerous both in civil and crimi-
nal law." Their effect in the criminal case is merely to
create an inference (in opposition to the accused's presump-
tion of innocence) casting upon the defendant the duty of
producing some evidence to the contrary. When this is
Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42 (1910).
7 Ibid.
"Ibid, 43. See also Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467 (1943), citing
the Turnipseed case and others, and stating:
"... a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience."
Supra, n. 77.
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done, the inference ends, and the question is for the trier of
facts.8 ' In the absence of opposing evidence there is no
reason why the jury may not find according to the pre-
sumption.12
To be a valid presumption according to the rule of the
Turnipseed case: (1) there must be some rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the fact presumed (the
weight of medical authority attests that this connection
exists, a conclusion which has been criticized) ;13 (2) the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate (even
the advocates of chemical tests admit that the tests are sub-
ject to error but claim that the standards are high enough
to allow a sufficient margin for error and that the presump-
tion is therefore reasonable);84 and (3) the defendant must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury,
in his defense, all of the facts bearing on the issue (the
model statute expressly affords this right to an accused)."
Tested by these criteria it would seem that enforcement of
the proposed statute would not be a violation of the due
process clause.8 6
Self Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution pro-
vides, "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . ." This provision
was interpreted by Justice Holmes in Holt v. United
States: 7
.. .. the prohibition of compelling a man in a crimi-
nal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material."8 8
UIbid, 43; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 704.
'9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940) 411.
Supra, n. 19.
Supra, n. 49.
8 Uniform Vehicle Code, 8upra, n. 61, Sec. 11-902(b)4:
"The foregoing provisions shall not be construed as limiting the in-
troduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question
whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor."
0 For a comprehensive discussion of presumptions and the chemical
testing statute see: Puett, Chemical Te8t8 For Intoxication In Tennes8ee,
23 Tenn. L. Rev. 178, 181 (1954).
- 218 U. S. 245 (1910).
U8Ibid, 252. The rule of this case remains the federal law but of. the con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S.
165, 179 (1952), and ,the dissenting opinion of Justices Black and Douglas
in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 442 (1957).
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Dean Wigmore in his treatise on EVIDENCE agrees with the
interpretation of the court in the Holt case. After review-
ing the history of the privilege and the spirit of the struggle
by which its establishment came about he concludes that
the object of the protection is to prevent ". . . the employ-
ment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips
an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place
of other evidence."8 9 Thus a distinction has been made be-
tween testimonial and real evidence.
The Fifth Amendment affords protection only in the
case of federal prosecutions and is not a bar to state
action." However, this privilege has been adopted by the
constitutions in all but two of the states. The variety of
phrasings which exist in the various state constitutions,
... neither enlarges nor narrows the scope of the
privilege as already accepted, understood, and judici-
ally developed in the common law. The detailed rules
are to be determined by the historical and logical re-
quirements of the principle, regardless of the particular
words of a particular constitution."91
Most of the state courts have also adopted the distinc-
tion made between real and testimonial evidence, holding
the former to be outside the scope of the privilege against
self incrimniation 2 Some state courts have been unwilling
to follow the interpretation of Justice Holmes and Dean
Wigmore, but these have been criticized for enlarging the
privilege beyond any intended limitations without thought
of the object sought to be accomplished."
The Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 22, pro-
vides, "That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case." Three recent Maryland
cases have dealt with this provision. In the case of Allen
8 Wio op, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940) 363.
10 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908). Confirmed In Adamson v.
California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) ; Brelthaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432 (1957).
Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), noted 2 Md. L. Rev. 174
(1938).
"WIoMoR, op. cit., supra, n. 89, 320-324.
Puett, supra, n. 86, 191, providing a list of cases; Wilson and Edman,
Evidence - Scientific Tests For Intoxication - Admissibility, 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 72, 81 (1952).
"Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects Of Blood Tests To Determine
Intoxication, 29 Va. L. Rev. 749, 764 (1943) ; McCoaMIcK, EvIDENCE (1st
ed., 1954) 265. See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 205:
"No person has a privilege . . . to refuse (a) to submit his body to
examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his corporal
features and other Identifying characteristics, or his physical or
mental condition, or (b) to furnish or to permit the taking of samples
of body fluids or substances for analysis."
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v. State" the accused was convicted of assault with intent
to rape. At the trial the prosecution sought to have the
defendant, who had taken the stand voluntarily, try on a
hat which was alleged to belong to him. This was allowed
by the trial court over the defendant's objection. The Court
of Appeals reversed, laying down the rule for what it
termed "borderline cases" dealing with self-incrimination.
The factor determining admissibility is:
".... who furnished or produced the evidence? If
the accused, especially in open court and on the witness
stand, is made to do so by performing an act or experi-
mentation which might aid in connecting him with the
crime and establishing his guilt, it is inadmissible.""5
One year later the Maryland courts were again faced
with this problem in Shanks v. State.9 6 In this case blood
was taken from the coat of a criminal defendant and
examined by a toxicologist who was later allowed to testify
in court as to what type it was. In affirming the lower court,
the Court of Appeals quoted from the Allen case to illus-
trate the difference between experiments made by the
accused in court and experiments made outside of court
and testified to by other witnesses in court and concluded:
"In the case at bar the appellant did not testify.
The blood was taken from his coat, and the evidence
as to it was produced by another witness. We can find
no justification for his contention that his constitu-
tional rights were violated in this respect." 7
Davis v. State,98 decided in 1948, again involved the
admissibility of a toxicologist's determination of blood
grouping from a sample taken from the defendant under
the guise of a medical examination. The lower court
allowed the testimony in evidence, and the Court of Ap-
peals, viewing the case as if there had been no consent,
affirmed. The court acknowledged the rule of the Allen
case but concluded as in Shanks v. State.
Thus in Maryland, where physical evidence is obtained
from the accused before trial and testimony based thereon
- 183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820, 171 A. L. R. 1138 (1944), noted 13 Md. L. Rev.
31 (1953).
Ibid, 611.
185 Md. 437,45 A. 2d 85, 163 A. L. R. 931 (1945).
Ibid, 444.
189 Md. 640, 57 A. 2d 289 (1948).
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is given in court by another, there is no violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. The sample taken for
use in a chemical test for intoxication being physical evi-
dence and the analysis thereof being made out of court,
the results of such a chemical test would therefore be
admissible over the objection of self-incrimination in the
federal courts, a majority of the state courts, and in
Maryland.
Search and Seizure
The search and seizure clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion is set out in the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . ."
Although the Fourth Amendment, as such, does not apply
to state action, the Supreme Court has held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by state officers but does not
preclude the use in state court proceedings of evidence so
obtained by them.99 Provisions prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures can be found also in most state con-
stitutions. All jurisdictions, both federal and state, allow
search of an individual and seizure of evidence following a
valid arrest, and the evidence so obtained is admissible.' 0
The question of non-admissibility arises where the search
and seizure are not made pursuant to a valid arrest.
The federal courts have held that evidence illegally
obtained by a federal officer,' or by a state officer acting
in conjunction with a federal officer,0 2 is inadmissible, both
in state and in federal proceedings. However, the federal
courts have held that evidence obtained by state officers,
acting alone, is admissible in federal proceedings although
the product of an illegal search.0 3 A minority of the state
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128
(1954) ; Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), noted 16 Md. L. Rev.
240 (1956) ; Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (1957).100 McCoRMICK, too. cit., supra, n. 93, 291; Ladd and Gibson, 8upra, n. 93,
767; Wilson and Edman, supra, n. 92, 82.
101 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). Evidence seized by
federal marshal after Illegal search was held inadmissible in federal pro-
ceeding. Rea v. United States, 8upra, n. 99. The Supreme Court held that
a federal officer should be enjoined from introducing in a state criminal
proceeding evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure or testifying
as to facts revealed by such search.
10Weeks v. United States, ibid.; Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74
(1949).
'0 Weeks v. United States, supra, n. 101; Feldman v. United States, 322
U. S. 487 (1944), dicta; United States v. Moses, 234 F. 2d 124 (7th Cir.,
1956) ; Gallegos v. United States, 237 F. 2d 694 (10th Cir., 1957). The one
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courts follow the federal rule and hold that evidence illeg-
ally seized is inadmissible. 104 Although severely criticized,
the rule has been considerably strengthened since its
adoption.105
The majority of the state courts hold that pertinent
evidence, no matter how obtained, is admissible against an
accused. 10 6 A provision similar to the Fourth Amendment
is found in Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and court decisions interpreting it have placed Maryland
with the majority. In Davis v. State,10 the Court of Ap-
peals stated:
"This State has aligned itself with those jurisdic-
tions holding that the question of how evidence is
obtained is collateral to the issue of the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, and, therefore, pertinent evi-
dence, no matter how obtained, will be admitted."
However, this rule was modified by the passage of Chapter
194 of the Acts of 1929, Code (1951) Article 35, Section 5,
commonly referred to as the "Bouse Act". Under this act
evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is generally
inadmissible in the trial of a misdemeanor. 08
In a majority of the states the results of a chemical in-
toxication test would be admissible in a trial even where
the testing sample was the fruit of an illegal search and
seizure. The federal courts and a minority of the state
exception is presented where the state officer is acting to enforce a federal
law. Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927). For a recent dis-
cussion of federal search and seizure see 16 Md. L. Rev. 240 (1956).
Wolf v. Colorado, 8upra, n. 99, 29.
1w For criticism see: 8 WIGMonX, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940), Sees. 2183,
2184, 2184a; Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-legal Aspects Of The Blood
Test To Determine Intoxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 215 (fn. 60) (1939).
But of. Chafee, The Progress Of The Law, 35 Har. L. Rev. 673, 695 (1922),
where the author states that without such a holding the Fourth Amendment
would be practically unenforceable, the civil action for damages and
possible criminal action being insufficient to uphold the rights of the in-
dividual; Gambino v. United States, 8upra, n. 103; Rea v. United States,
supra, n. 99; 50 A. L. R. 2d 531.
10* Wolf v. Colorado, supra, n. 99, 29; The Constitution of the United
States of America, Analysis and Interpretation (1953) 830; Wilson and
Edman, supra, n. 92. The majority would, however, be subject to the above
federal policy regarding a state officer acting 'to enforce a federal law and a
federal officer participating in a state proceeding, 8upra, circa, p. 211.
'
T Supra, n. 98, 645.
06 The Act is not applicable to prosecutions for carrying a concealed
weapon, to prosecutions under the state narcotic laws, in certain counties
for prosecutions for violating gambling laws, and in other counties for
prosecutions for violating lottery laws. An exception is also made in
Wicomico County to prosecutions for violation of alcoholic beverage laws.
For a discussion of the history and validity of the Bouse Act and the excep-
tions thereto see Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954), noted 14 Md.
L. Rev. 299 (1954).
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courts would admit results procured by their own officers
only where they were obtained incident to or following a
valid arrest. In Maryland, since "driving while under the
influence" is a misdemeanor, the test results would be
admissible under the Bouse Act only where, as in the fed-
eral and minority state courts, prior to the procurement of
the sample there was a valid arrest. Where no arrest pre-
cedes the procurement of the test sample, unless consent
is found, the evidence is not admissible in the absence of
enabling legislation.109
Due Process and Physical Violence
The Supreme Court in Rochin v. California,"' has in-
dicated another possible constitutional objection to the
admissibility of the results of chemical tests for intoxica-
tion. In that case capsules of morphine were forced from
the defendant's stomach by the use of a stomach pump
after physical attempts to recover the capsules failed. A
conviction for a narcotics offense obtained in the state
courts was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground
that the method used to recover the evidence violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its
opinion the Court said:
"This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illeg-
ally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there,
the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents -
this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensi-
bilities. They are methods too close to the rack and
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.""'
The doctrine of this case could conceivably be applied
to the chemical testing situation; for even where there is a
valid arrest it could be argued that if the defendant has
refused to submit to the test, forcible extraction of a test-
ing substance from his body would be "conduct that shocks
House Bill No. 13, Maryland's recently defeated (by a voice vote in the
Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings) chemical testing statute, a
facsimile of the model statute, provided: "The results of any such tests
as specified hereinabove in this section shall be received as evidence in any
court of law or equity or before any judge, justice of the peace or other
tribunal in this State as presumptive evidence in the case or cases at issue"
and would thus have avoided the effect of the Bouse Act in the chemical
tests for intoxication area.
11342 U. S. 165 (1952).
SIbtd, 172.
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the conscience"." 2 It would seem that the answer to this
argument lies in the language used by the Court in the
Rochin case where at page 171 it said:
"The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the
duty of exercising a judgment, within the narrow
confines of judicial power in reviewing State con-
victions, upon interests of society pushing in opposite
directions."
The "interests of society" are, on the one hand, the right of
the individual not to be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; and, on the other, the
desire of the state to keep its roads free from the driver
who is under the influence and who is thus endangering
the lives of his fellow citizens.
This problem was squarely presented to the United
States Supreme Court in the recent case of Breithaupt v.
Abram,"3 the first chemical testing case to be argued before
that body. Breithaupt was involved in a serious automo-
bile accident in New Mexico in which three persons were
killed. While he was lying unconscious in the emergency
room of a hospital the attending physician, at the request
of a state patrolman, withdrew a sample of his blood which
upon analysis was found to contain 0.17 per cent alcohol.
Breithaupt was tried for involuntary manslaughter, and
testimony of the results of the analysis and the significance
thereof was admitted into evidence over his objection. He
was subsequently convicted and sentenced. Instead of ap-
pealing the conviction, Breithaupt petitioned the Supreme
Court of New Mexico for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing
that the conviction based on the results of the involuntary
blood test deprived him of his liberty without due process
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The petition was denied," 5 and the United States Supreme
"2 Bednarik v. Bednarlk, 18 N. J. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80, 90 (1940) ; State
v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283, dis. op., 292 (1945) ; State v. Weltha,
228 Iowa 519, 292 N. W. 148 (1940) ; State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79
N. W. 2d 810 (1956). However, see: People v. Duroncelay, 146 A. Cal.
App. 96, 303 P. 2d 617 (1956) ; Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P. 2d 512
(1951) ; State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 211 P. 2d 142 (1949) ; State v. Cram,
176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945).
"'352 U. S. 432 (1957).
14 The petitioner also claimed, unsuccessfully, that the search and seizure
clause of the Fourth Amendment and the self incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment should be applied in this case by extension of these pro-
tections through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), the court summarily dismissed
these arguments.
-- 58 N. M. 385, 271 P. 2d 827 (1954).
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Court granted certiorari. 16 In affirming, with three justices
dissenting and after a comparison of the immediate case
with the Rochin case, the Court concluded, "that a blood
test taken [from an unconscious person] by a skilled tech-
nician is not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience',
[citing Rochin v. California] nor such a method of obtain-
ing evidence that it offends a 'sense of justice' .. .,117 The
Court warned that the indiscriminate taking of blood under
other conditions or by persons not competent to do so might
amount to such brutality as would come under the Rochin
rule,"8 but held ". . . the absence of conscious consent, with-
out more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation
of a constitutional right","' thus indicating that although a
chemical test might violate due process under the Rochin
case, the methods used would have to be equally "shocking"
and "brutal". As before, the Court indicated that the public
policy underlying its decision was a balancing of the in-
terests of society against the rights of the individual.120
The Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 23, pro-
vides:
"That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or out-
lawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or de-
prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judg-
ment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land."
"6351 U. S. 906 (1956).
nU Supra, n. 113, 437. At p. 436, the court explained "... due process is
not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram
of the most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of 'decency
and fairness' that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of
acceptable conduct." In a footnote to the majority opinion the court rea-
soned, "The fact that so many States make use of the tests negatives the
suggestion that there is anything offensive about them."
Supra, n. 113, 437-438.
1 Ibid, 435.
Supra, n. 113, 43940:
"As against the right of an individual that his person be held in-
violable, even against so slight an intrusion as Is involved in applying
a blood test of the kind to which millions of Americans submit as a
matter of course nearly every day, must be set the interests of society
In the scientific determination of intoxication, one of the great causes
of the mortal hazards of the road. And the more so since the test like-
wise may establish innocence, thus affording protection against the
treachery of judgment based on one or more of the senses. Further-
more, since our criminal law is to no small extent Justified by the
assumption of deterrence, the individual's right to immunity from such
invasion of the body as is involved in a properly safeguarded blood test
is far outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect due to public
realization that the issue of driving while under the influence of
alcohol can often by this method be taken out of the confusion of con-
flicting contentions."
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals in Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co. 2'
has interpreted "Law of the Land" to be the equivalent of
"due process of law" used in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. If the conduct of state officers
in extracting a testing sample would not be a violation of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment it would
probably also not be a denial of due process under Article
23 of the Declaration of Rights. Viewed in the light of the
Breithaupt and Rochin cases it seems unlikely that this con-
duct, short of brutality or physical violence, would violate
either clause.'22
CONCLUSION
There is a definite need for a valid test for intoxication.
Viewed in the light of the above analysis it appears that
the tests which utilize blood and breath are sufficiently
accurate and pose no insurmountable problems of constitu-
tionality or admissibility. The states which have enacted
the model statute and have utilized the chemical tests
which it sanctions report favorable results.12 8 It is for the
legislature and the law enforcement agencies to deter-
mine whether this is to be the solution to the problem in
Maryland. "4
131 Md. 265, 270, 101 A. 710 (1917).
For a collection and discussion of cases dealing with chemical tests
and the constitutional questions involved see 164 A. L. R. 967, 25 A. L. R.
2d 1407, Sees. 2-6, and A. L. R. 2d Supp. Serv., pp. 1538-1540.
Lester, Greenberg, Tiernan, Driving Under The Influence of Alcohol,
14 Q. J. Studies on Alcohol 614 (1953); Harger, Lamb, and Hulpieu,
A Rapid Chemical Te8t For Intoxication Employing Breath, 110 J. A. M. A.
779, 784 (1938).
2 Although chemical tests can be used without companion legislation,
passage of House Bill No. 13 by the Maryland Legislature would have
greatly facilitated their administrative and judicial acceptance in Mary-
land. See n. 109, 8upra.
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